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ARISTOTLE ON THE NATURE OF LOGOS
©John P. Anton 
Department of Philosophy 
University of South Florida 
Tampa, Florida
I. Synopsis
Attention has been frequently drawn to the problems attending attempts "to trace a long progression of 
meanings in the history of the word logos" (Kerferd). Especially difficult proved the assigning to Aristotle a 
place in this long progression. One of the reasons is that we have yet to reconstruct his theory of logos. The 
difficulty is not so much with the complexity of the uses of the term in his works as it is with the widely 
recognized fact that he left no special treatise on the subject of a doctrine of logos, not to be confused with 
the instrumentalities found in the so-called logical works that comprise the Organon. The doctrine is not to 
be found in the Metaphysics any more than it is treated in the biological works. Yet it exists, presumably with 
the pieces dispersed in the various texts, waiting for the investigators to find and fit the parts into a coherent 
whole. So far no such systematic opus has been produced, despite the number of interpretive attempts made 
in recent times to identify what may conceivably count for a doctrine of logos. The importance of such a 
doctrine or theory can hardly be denied, since it could, inter alia, provide the basis for a full explanation of 
the intriguing connection between the two definitions of anthropos as logical and political animal. In pursuing 
such a goal, certain interpreters found it tempting to reduce logos to language, broadly understood (Randall; 
Mesthene, and Wedin).
The central issue this paper explores is the possibility of detecting a way, supported with what the texts 
afford, to answer the question "What is logos", but do so not in the obvious sense of discussing the outcomes 
of its operations, e.g. discourse, account, demonstration or definition, nor by stringing together textual 
references to reconstruct the mechanics of articulating and communicating, but seeking to understand logos 
qua ousia, though not as logos of an ousia. The paper sets forth the parameters for an inquiry in hope to 
identify the components of this elusive doctrine.
II. The Problem of a Theory of logos.
An initial condition must be met to solve the problem regarding the building of a theory of logos, and it 
consists of two parts: (a) to view logos as an exclusive activity of anthrôpos, and (b) to consider the differentia 
indicating a property, named by the adjective ‘logikos’ as part of the "essence", the ti esti of anthrôpos. Since 
this property cannot be subsumed under any genus of being, γένος τού δντος, other than that of ousia, the 
possibility that logos be seen as a case of co-incidental being, συμβεβηκος öv, is excluded.1 If logos is neither 
an ousia nor a case of a symbebëkos on what, then, is its identity?
I will begin with a fundamental Aristotelian position, that truth and falsity are things "being said", 
statements referring to individual things. This is a relation between legomena and onta. When the statement 
qua legomenon suits the fact, whatever it may be in each case, then the statement is true, and false when it 
does not. Without this correlation between speech and what speech is about there can be no truth and hence 
no knowledge.
The involvement of language in the pursuit of knowledge is everywhere in Aristotle’s works. Outside of 
this involvement, neither truth nor knowledge can be referred to, except in some metaphorical way. The visual 
arts, for instance, since they do not communicate orally, make statements only metaphorically; the ergon they 
produce requires supplemental verbal work to report what is being conveyed, besides colors, lines, visual effects 
in general. Even the poetic arts that depend on speech, dramatic, epic and lyric poetry, if truth is embodied 
in them, it must be articulated, brought back in the guise of statements free of metaphor and emotional 
X tension. But the referential aspects of poetic works, as onta by technê, do not present a problem. With respect 
to truth they involve the use language in the background rather than in the foreground. Nevertheless, the truth 
they contain is a function of ascertainable references to onta.
The main question this paper will try to answer is "What is logos? What is its identity, how it is related
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to ousia, and why it is not a symbebëkos on? This is the major issue in Aristotle.2 The prevailing 
interpretation is that logos is in some broad sense of the term "language". For example, Randall (1960), 
followed by Mesthene (1964), have argued in favor of language, the source of which is nous poiëtikos, which 
in turn generates logos. More recently, Wedin (1988) has concluded independently and more persuasively that 
logos is essentially language as well as a faculty, the latter being distinct from nous and dianoia, yet intimately 
connected to both. The issue Wedin left unanswered was the identity of the faculty involved and its precise 
location as the source of logos? In this paper my remarks are limited to explaining an alternative answer in 
the context of the following problem: how are the two differentiae, "logical" and "political", in the two 
respective definitions of anthröpos (Pol. 1253a9-10: λόγον δε μόνον άνθρωπος εχει των ζφων, and 1252b30: 
ό άνθρωπος φύσει ζωον πολιτικόν) interconnected.
Reconstructing Aristotle’s theory of logos calls for more than collecting and enumerating the diverse 
functions of logos, such as sending signs, uttering warnings, exclaiming or refusing, exhibiting anger and threats, 
or announcing pleasures and pains. All these uses, naturally enough, when verbal sounds are used, fall within 
the domain of logos, but the problem of its identity cannot be solved through a theory of sound, grimace, 
gesture, even language. Nor is logos the same of nous, conventionally translated as reason, despite certain 
interconnected operations. Two pitfalls must be avoided here: (a) collapsing the faculties of nous and logos, 
for by so doing neither the identity of logos nor the nature of language is properly revealed; and (b) translating 
the expression ζωον λογικόν as "rational animal". The latter conceals a misleading rendition since it makes 
logos interchangeable with "reason", in this case with nous. The two adjectives, ‘logical’ and ‘rational’, the one 
Greek the other Latin, do not cover the same grounds technically speaking. The term ‘rational’, as Kerferd 
has suggested, does not refer directly to logos and its diverse meanings.
The thesis I defend is that the concept of logos, no matter how many operations it covers, is not an 
appendix of nous. I hope to show that logos is best understood in connection with the faculty Aristotle call 
το κριτικόν (to kritikori). A special function of to kritikon includes the power to signify by means of articulate 
sounds, logos, seen as the entelecheia of the kritikon, fashions and develops systems of signs, including the 
comptes system of language, as its efficient and material tools, i.e. its communicative, including the audible, 
media.
Another preliminary note must be added at this point. It concerns the intelligible aspects of things and 
logos as dynamis and energeia. In one sense, all facts are "logical", but they are so only dynamei, i.e. their logical 
aspects are in principle cognizable and formulable in discourse. But it takes human logos to articulate the 
logical structures of the world and render them as knowledge. This is the logos, as the actuality of the kritikon 
when it cooperates with the other powers of the soul.4 Briefly put, whereas things or onta do not have logos 
qua energeia they do so qua dynamei', they are logical in that they are intelligible.
III. Reconstructing the theory
Given the philosophical importance of the doctrine of logos it is important not that we try to explore its 
theoretical foundations, especially in view of the celebrated dictum that man is by nature a logical animal, 
whereby logos is introduced as the differentiating feature of human life. Aristotle added to this definition 
something else: "makers of things" that human beings are deliberate makers. If humans are logical by nature 
and not by chance, they must possess such faculties or powers that make the features of being political and 
being logical interrelated and coordinate. That humans know or cognize by nature is a plain enough fact. We 
possess sense organs that enable us to discriminate one thing from another as needed for survival. The issue 
then is not about sensing or knowing, leaving epistëmë aside for the moment, but knowing logically, i.e. in 
accordance with logos. It is this issue that calls for looking into this peculiar activity by asking: What does it 
mean to have logos and use it; briefly put, What is logos?5
All situations of communication enter the domain of logos but logos goes beyond the level of either sound, 
grimace, gesture, even language. Still, logos is not the same as reason (nous) despite the overlapping of their 
operations. Collapsing the two faculties does nothing to help reveal the nature either of language or logos. 
Translating ζδοη logikon as "rational animal" makes logos interchangeable with reason. But these two 
adjectives, logical and rational, do not cover the same territory. What would Aristotle have to say about this 
facile interchange in the translations? One response would be to say that the term "rational" does not refer
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directly to logos and its diverse meanings, as Kerferd has suggested.6 What I am suggesting is that 
conceptually, logos covers a set of operations connected with but still different from those of reason (nous). 
In the sequel I will try to outline the differences, hoping that what I say might help remove a few cobwebs, 
rather than add more to the existing ones.
III. Proposal for a solution
There is a long tradition that goes back to the beginnings of Greek philosophy and poetry that recognized 
logos as a cosmic element and source of intelligibility, sometimes rivaling other archai, especially nous, for the 
central position of the ultimate origin of order. Aristotle, it would seem, moved away from speculative and 
mythical accounts opting for one that would accord with the facts and sustains confidence in their 
intelligibility. In explaining relative praise and blame in case of minor deviations from mesotes, i.e. of certain 
types of ethical judgments, Aristotle says that in these cases the judge does not err (λανθάνει), and adds:
ό δέ μέχρι τίνος και έπι πόσον ψεκτός ού ράδιον τώ λόγω άφορίσαι* ούδε γάρ άλλο ούδέν των 
αισθητών· τα δε τοιαύτα έν τοις καθ’ εκαστα, και έν τή αισθήσει ή κρίσις. Nie. Eth. 1109b20-22
Yet to what degree and how much a man must be blamed is not easy to determine by definition. For 
this is true of all sensible objects; regarding cases of degree in particular circumstances the judgment 
(krisis) lies with sense-perception.
Αϊσθησις is called a σύμφυτος κριτική δυναμις, a natural faculty within aisthesis. This critical power 
reaches beyond sensation, as we shall see. Yet, by being present in the operation of sensation, by being 
activated along with sensation in the activity of the sensing of sensible objects, its work extends beyond what 
the sense organ does. Aristotle speaks of the kritikon also in Post. Anal. 99b35, where he states that it is 
present in all animals equipped with the power of sensing, but in the case of human beings, who retain the 
effects of sensing as memories, which in turn are subject to the unifying process of nous, the kritikon becomes 
the transmitting supplier of materials for knowledge (gnôsis) once the formation of universals is done. Hence, 
we have a special and very important case of kritikon. As we shall see, th& kritikon is present in, or rather co­
operating with, all the other faculties; to state this process differently, it is the same kritikon, pervasive and 
common to all the other parts of the soul; indeed it has the same unity as the soul itself.
Each sense organ is in a neutral condition prior to its activation and in a state that lies between 
contraries, i. e. the contraries as properties of the corresponding sensible objects. Their perceptible range of 
properties, depending on the capability of the sense organ, is covered potentially. The actualization of the 
power of the sense organ is one thing, the judgment related to every instance of perception, quite another. 
The latter is the work of the kritikon in aisthesis. Instances of cold (psychron) and hot (thermon) are 
experienced only as they differ from the neutral condition of our sense organs, i.e. as cases of excess and 
deficiency (υπερβολή, έλλειψις): ώς τής αίσθήσεως Οιον μεσότης τίνος οΰσης τοις έν τοις αισθητής 
έναντιώσεως (De An. 424a4). In the same work, and referring to Plato’s Timaeus, Aristotle uses the verb 
hinein, to judge and to discriminate:
κρίνεται δε τα πράγματα τα μεν νω, τα δέ έπιστήμη τα δε δόξη, τα δ’ αισθήσει.
Things are judged, some by reason, others by knowledge, others again by opinion and others by 
sensation. (Hicks tr.)
The important thing here is that hinein is done through a variety of agents, and hence it is a common 
operation, or rather a co-operation used by nous, epistëme, doxa and aisthesis. Here is where the kritikon of 
human beings is radically different from what it does in a limited way in other animals. The brief discussion 
on the kritikon in De Anima Book II, where a slightly different list of powers of the soul is given, need not 
detract from the account of kritikon. The list of powers is not used to introduce for the analysis of the 
pervasive function of kritikon? To understand the operation of kritikon, we need certain distinctions
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introduced in De Anima II 4, where he says that the inquirer must ascertain what each faculty is, be it the 
noëtikon, the aisthëtikon, or the threptikon. Here the noëükon replaces the dianoëtikon. And in De Anima III 
2, 426b8-12, he declares that each sensation discriminates and judges: κρίνει:
έκαστη μεν ούν αϊσθησις του υποκειμένου αισθητού έστίν. ύπάρχουσα τω αίσθητηρίω ή αισθητήριον 
και κρίνει τάς τού υποκειμένου αισθητού διαφοράς, οίον λευκόν μεν καί μέλαν δψις, γλυκύ δε καί 
πικρόν γεΰσις. ομοίως δ’ έχει τούτο καί επί των άλλων.
Each sense is concerned with its own sensible object, being resident in the organ qua sense-organ,and 
judges the specific differences of its own sensible object. Thus sight pronounces upon white and 
black, taste upon sweet and bitter, and so with the rest (Hicks tr.)
This particular chapter is crucial.8 Aristotle uses the verb legein to mean "to identify and report" 
differences in sensible qualities as between sweet in the case of taste, and white in that of vision, and to show 
that they are cases that go beyond the differences encountered in the same sensation, as it is with different 
colors. Here legein is used to identify and judge differences. He argues that hinein has to be one and the same 
faculty in carrying out all instances of judging and for all sensible differences. Therefore, no separate sense 
organ is needed for this pervasive operation. Judging is built into all sensation and all the other faculties. Thus 
in De Anima III 2, 426M5-24:
ή καί δήλον δτι ή σαρξ ούκ εστι τδ έσχατον αισθητήριον* ανάγκη γάρ ήν άπτόμενον αυτού κρίνειν 
το κρίνον, ούτε δη κεχωρισμένοις ενδέχεται κρίνειν δτι έτερον το γλυκύ τού λευκού, άλλα δει ένί 
τινι άμφω δήλα είναι, ούτω μεν γάρ καν εί τού μεν εγώ τού δε σύ αϊσθοιο, δήλον αν εϊη δτι έτερα 
άλλήλων. δει δε το εν λέγειν δτι έτερον έτερον γάρ το γλυκύ τού λευκού, λέγει άρα το αυτό, ώστε 
ώς λέγει, ούτω καί νοεί καί αισθάνεται, ότι μεν ούν ούχ οίόν τε κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τα 
κεχωρισμένα, δήλον. δτι δ’ ούδ’ εν κεχωρισμένφ χρόνω εντεύθεν.
Thus it is clear that the flesh is not the ultimate organ of sense; for, if it were, it would be necessary 
that which judges should judge by contact with the sensible object. Nor indeed can we with separate 
organs judge that sweet is different from white, but both objects must be clearly presented to some 
single faculty. For, if we could, then the mere fact of my perceiving one thing and your perceiving 
another would make it clear that the two things were different. But the single faculty is required to 
pronounce them different, for sweet and white are [pronounced] different. It is one and the same 
faculty, then, which so pronounces, so it also thinks and perceives. Clearly, then, it is not possible 
with separate organs to pronounce judgment upon things that are separate: nor yet at separate times, 
as the following considerations show. (Hicks tr.)9
The conclusion follows, stated in the form of a question:
άρ’ ούν άμα μεν καί αριθμώ αδιαίρετον καί άχώριστον το κρίνον, τφ είναι δε κεχωρισμένον; 
(427a2-3)
Is, then, that which judges simultaneously in its judgment and numerically undivided and inseparable, 
although separated logically? (Hicks tr.)
The answer that shapes up is that the krinon while logically divisible (diaireton), locally and numerically 
is also indivisible (adiaireton); hence it is one, and it judges simultaneously. Insofar as it is divisible it is plural, 
for it uses the same point at the same time twice. Such is the faculty of the krinon. And in De Anima III 3, 
Aristotle refers to two different characteristics which par excellence define the soul: (a) movement from place 
to place and (b) noein (thinking), hinein (judging), and aisthanesthai (sensing). He writes:
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δοκει δέ και το νοείν και το φρονειν ώσπερ αίσθάνεσθαί τι είναι (έν άμφοτέροις γαρ τούτοις 
κρίνει τι ή ψυχή και γνωρίζει των δντων). (427al9-21)
Both thought and intelligence are commonly regarded as a kind of perception, since the soul in both 
of these judges and recognizes something existent. (Hicks tr.)
However, that a judgment may occur as a product of an activity, cannot come about unless the elements 
of which it is composed are brought together as a combination of thought units, noëmata. And it is this 
combination of noëmata that constitutes truth and falsity. Another way of putting it, as it is said in the 
Organon, truth and falsity are properties of statements, and statements are in fact symplokai noëmatôn, each 
noëma communicated 2& phonë sëmantikë. In De Anima III 8 ,432a 11-12, we are told what phantasia does not 
do; it does not perform any symplokë noëmatôn, and this deficiency is readily explained by what it is that 
phantasia supplies: phantasmata, not noëmata. Here is where Aristotle should have re-introduced hinein, if 
he wanted to formulate a theory of language. Actually he does provide the rudiments for such a logos, but only 
in passing, in III 9, 432al5-19:
έπει δε ή ψυχή κατά δύο ώρισται δυνάμεις ή των ζώων, τφ τε κριτικφ, δ διανοίας εργον έστι και 
αίσθήσεως, και ετι τφ κινειν τήν κατά τόπον κίνησιν, περί μεν αισθήσεως και νοΰ διωρίσθω 
τοσαΰτα, περί δε τού κινοΰντος, τί ποτέ έστι τής ψυχής σκεπτέον.
The soul in animals has been defined in virtue of two faculties, not only by its capacity to judge, 
which is the function of thought and perception, but also by the local movement which it imparts 
to the animal. Assuming the nature of sensation and intellect to have been so far determined, we 
have now to consider what it is in the soul which initiates motion. (Hicks tr.)
The capacity to judge, to notice, to record and to communicate differences, belongs to both sensing and 
thinking, mtikos nous is not to be in any living body unless that body is equipped with the power of sensation. 
Next we notice another crucial passage bearing on our theme; it occurs in De Motu Animalium 6 ,700bl7 sqq.:
όρώμεν δέ τα κινοΰντα το ζφον διάνοιαν και φαντασίαν και προαίρεσιν και βούλησιν και 
έπιθυμίαν. ταύτα δέ πάντα άνάγεται εις νουν και δρεξιν. και γαρ ή φαντασία και ή αϊσθησις τήν 
αυτήν έν τω νφ χώραν εχουσι* κριτικά γαρ πάντα, διαφέρουσι δε κατά τάς είρημένας έν άλλοις 
διαφοράς.
Now we see that the things which move the animal are intellect, imagination, purpose, wish and 
appetite. Now all these can be referred to mind and desire. For imagination and sensation cover the 
same ground as the mind since they all exercise judgement though they differ in certain aspects as 
has been defined elsewhere.10 (Forster tr.)
The key expression κριτικά γαρ πάντα is translated by Nussbaum (1978) "all are concerned with making 
distinctions." It will not do to limit the kritikon to the mental operation of making distinctions, kritikon, as used 
is this passage, does not explicitly refer to the function of detecting existing and discoverable differences in 
the variety of symbebekota; the analysis of the genera of being has shown why the items collected under each 
genus render each a pollachös legomenon.n
Nussbaum’s comment following the dismissal of associating kritika with judging is not relevant to the 
present discussion; what stands out is what she understands to be her agreement with Cooper’s position, 
although she cites only the conclusion of an argument. Assuming that she has correctly stated Cooper’s 
position on the issue, the latter’s interpretation finds no support in Aristotle text. The claim Nussbaum puts 
forth is excessive and draws from selected passages certain irrelevant conjectures, especially the ones that are 
said to pertain to (a) reflective judgment and (b) verbal performance. In the first place, Aristotle is associating 
the faculties to which he refers — a point Nussbaum fails to acknowledge—with the only animal that possesses
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them, Le., the human animal. Hence, it is misleading to bring into the discussion all living beings, especially 
the ones that Aristotle credits with a limited degree of intelligence, as he does in the De Anima. Furthermore, 
it is these complex discriminations in the co-operation of the faculties, generally of aisthesis, dianoia, and nous, 
that constitute the content of cognitive verbal performances. This is precisely where language begins: in the 
pervasive operations of the kritikon. It should be noted that the kritikon does not initiate the discriminations 
it reports, nor does it create the contents it judges. However, its effectiveness is such that it alone of all the 
faculties decides what constitutes the difference between fiction and reality.
IV. The kritikon as entelecheia
It would seem that the best way to settle the problem under consideration is to associate logos with 
entelecheia. We may now make a preliminary exploration of a path already suggested. Perhaps we must 
introduce the concept of entelecheia, for it is in this ontological connection we may identify the nature of logos 
as both dynamis and energeia. But to defend this hypothesis would require that there be an analogous passing 
of logos from first entelecheia to second entelecheia, i.e. to logos as it develops to nearing its own completion. 
The process would reveal how logos makes itself known in action. Integral to this process is understanding the 
intelligible features of the world, how its knowable aspects become "logical" or rather, if one prefers, how logos, 
as the object of logos, becomes the content of human logos and includes itself in attaining completion.
A way to begin would be to say that logos is an arche, and be viewed as the other side of the coin, 
whereby nous is the one and logos is the other, and say that the soul, in its capacity as nous, grasps the 
principles and universale that logos uses and articulates. By making audible the principles that nous intuits, 
logos informs experience by means of the requisite significant symbols for communication. It is logos that 
enables communication to take on the shape of words, propositions and syllogisms. But logos does more than 
that: it also enables the language it fashions to articulate the emotions and desires in naming and expressing 
the states of the psyche. Even in this area of change and experience the kritikon arranges, discriminates further, 
chooses and connects general concepts. Hence, whatever cannot fit the measure of logos is either chaotic or 
self-contradictory, both being outside the power of aisthësis and nous, and hence forever excluded from the 
realm of science, indeed from all significant discourse.
The principle of contradiction, a principle of logos, in control of all meaningful language, is true of all 
discourse, of all propositional talking about things, of legomena haplôs and of onta, insofar are they are said 
to be. The processes of onta although delimited within contraries are themselves not subjects of 
contradictories. The latter are not principles of onta, for they occur as simultaneously paired propositions when 
forcibly conjoined. Thus, as cognizing conjoins ta legomena to ta onta, the principle of non-contradiction 
obtains, just as it does in the case of legomena as well as in that of the named things constructed by the technë 
of discourse. The latter can be perfectly illustrated from the way onta occur in the world of poetry, which is 
what makes the logos of poetry or poetry as logos significant and true.12
It is one thing to investigate language, quite another to investigate logos. This is so because language and 
logos are not identical; it also explains why language can be inquired into, be a subject matter, but still it is 
not logos. Logos about language and logos about logos are simply not the same activity, although both carry 
the meaning of special inquiries. The former is feasible, the latter is not. Caution is advised at this point lest 
we postulate a realm of the alogon, that which may be inferred as being outside or beyond logos, the non-logos, 
the ontological alogon. Chance events are unrelated to what is alogon, i.e. what cannot be experienced and 
explained; actually they are explainable but unpredictable; they happen incidentally.
V. Logos and the Polis
We may now return to the remark made early in this paper concerning the connection between the logikon 
and the politikon. If the polis is prior by nature, so is logos. And if polis is for the sake of eudaimonia, hou 
heneka, so is logos. Logos is teleological, just as are all the faculties of the soul, indeed the soul itself is. Logos 
is inseparable from the meaning of the telos of human beings. Separating logos, in whole or in part, from the 
telos that belongs to it or from the telos of the polis, is fatal to the pursuit of eudaimonia. Hence, treating logos 
in abstraction, i.e. apart from the political context, or vice versa from the context of logos, leads to serious 
errors. But when treating is done in the name of some analysis, all it can mean is that only a select aspect of
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logos or polis is actually being lifted from the total field and given prominence beyond its representative value. 
In other words, the part is turned into the whole. When logos is understood as prior or arche, the coming into 
being of polis is a necessary natural event. Seen thus, the polis is not to be understood as the outcome of social 
contract.13
Can there be arete without logos! Since arete is hexis proairetike, the act of proairesis is indicative of logos 
functioning as the detection of differences and the shaping of choices, thus providing a guide to the action; 
it is present as deliberate action become habitual.14 Aristotle writes in Politics 1 1 ,1253a 30-36:
Φύσει μεν ή όρμή έν πάσιν έπι την τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν ό δε πρώτος συστήσας μεγίστων αγαθών 
αίτιος· ώσπερ γαρ καί τελειωθεν βέλτιστον τών ζώων ό άνθρωπός έστιν, οΰτω καί χωρισθέν νόμου 
καί δίκης χείριστον πάντων, χαλεπωτάτη γαρ αδικία εχουσα όπλα, ό δ’ άνθρωπος όπλα εχων 
φύεται φρονήσει καί αρετή οίς επί τάναντία εστι χρήσθαι μάλιστα, διό άνοσιώτατον καί 
άγριώτατον άνευ αρετής καί προς αφροδίσια καί έδωδήν χείριστον.
The impulse to form a partnership of this kind is present in all men by nature; but the man who first 
united people in such partnership was the greatest of benefactors. For as man is the best of animals 
when perfected, so he is the worst of all when sundered from law and right. For unrighteousness is 
most pernicious when possessed of weapons, and man is born possessing weapons for the use of 
wisdom and excellence, which it is possible to employ entirely for the opposite ends. Hence when 
devoid of excellence man is the most unholy and savage of animals, and the worse in sexual 
indulgence and in gluttony. (Rackham tr.)
Logos does not vanish even when seriously abused. It is still there but distorted, or rather it is 
dysfunctioning. And so will the polis in which such dysfunctioning becomes acceptable social habit. The price 
to be paid is suffering under deviant constitutions.
NOTES
1. That logos cannot be turned into an accidental on comes up in connection with the logos tës ousias of 
anthröpos, whereby the ousia words are anthröpos, zöon, and the word logikon serves as the differentia. It would 
be peculiar, to say the least, to call what the adjective logikon names an ousia since what it names belongs to 
another ousia as the property that differentiates anthröpos from all other species of living things. Furthermore, 
calling logikon an ousia would violate the stipulation that there cannot be an ousia of ousia, i.e. against the 
case of on in Categories lb whereby ούτε έν ύποκειμένω έστί, ούτε καθ’ υποκειμένου λέγεται. The alternative 
is to view logos in the context of what anthröpos is qua ousia.
2. This is an immense topic. The entry "logos” in the Oxford Classical Dictionary, devotes only two to three 
sentences to Aristotle; the rest of the article goes on to discuss the uses of logos in religion. The absence of 
a systematic treatment of logos in its rich and applied senses as well as contexts is difficult to explain. For 
instance, there is very little in Hicks’ commentary on the De Anima, despite the exegetic comments on 
individual passages where the term logos occurs. The same holds for Ross’s commentary on the same work. 
I have found no single book that treats logos in the context of a comprehensive theory.
3. A close discussion of the merits of these positions is reserved for a longer version of this paper under 
preparation for publication.
4. De anima, III 428a 1-5: εΐ δή εστιν ή φαντασία καθ’ ήν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ήμ ίν γίγνεσθαι καί μή 
ε ί τι κατά μεταφοράν λέγομεν, μία tís εστι τούτων δύναμι$ η έξις, καθ’ ην κρίνομεν καί άληθεύομεν η 
ψευδόμεθα. τοιαυται δ’ εισίν αϊσθησις, δόξα, επιστήμη, voi)s. "If imagination is the process by which we say 
that an image is presented to us, and not anything which we call imagination metaphorically, it is one of the 
faculties or states or habits by which we judge and speak truly or falsely." (Hett tr. Loeb, with changes).
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5. Since the listing of the passages referring to the operations of logos is not exhaustive it does not guide the 
reader to look for those that pertain to a theory about logos. See Bonitz Index Aristotelicum, where the related 
passages are listing under the following heads: word, language, or speech; thought; reasoning; mathematical 
proportion, and relation. For Plato’s list, see F. M. Cornford, Plato’s Theory o f Knowledge (1935), 142, n. 1.
6. In his article "logos” (Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, volume 5, pp. 83-4). Kerferd has drawn attention to the 
problems that attend any attempt "to trace a logical progression of meanings in the history of the word" 
(logos). He notes that such attempts "are now generally acknowledged to lack any secure foundation, and even 
to try to trace out the history of a single ‘logos doctrine’ in Greek philosophy is to run the rusk of searching 
for a simple pattern when the truth was much more complex." The reason he gives is plain enough: the word 
logos covers any of the following: word, speech, argument, explanation, doctrine, esteem, numerical 
computation, measure, proportion, plea, principle and reason. One may conveniently want to add to this 
intriguing list, but it should suffice to explain the complexity of the undertaking. Kerferd is correct in the case 
of historical collections of uses found in different periods and thinkers. The problem I discuss in this paper 
deals not with the difficulties that confront the effort to discover "a single logos doctrine" in Greek philosophy 
but whether Aristotle had such a doctrine not reducible to the set of uses of the word.
7. Book II lists the following: nutrition (threptikon), appetency (orektikon), sensation (aisthëtikon), locomotion 
(kmëtikon kata topon), understanding, reasoning (dianoëtikon), and nous. Orexis includes desire, (<epithymia), 
thymos and boulësis. Aristotle adds that the animals that have dianoia also have logismos, implying that this 
is the special case of human beings. Lowe (1993) in his otherwise interesting article discusses how κρίνειν is 
used in the activities of sensation and thinking but stops short of arguing whether κρίνειν is a distinct faculty.
8. Hamlyn (1968) 121, however, thinks otherwise; he writes: "This chapter is a rambling one, but it begins and 
ends with a consideration of what are fundamentally the problems of self-consciousness." A different 
perspective, such as the one presented here, is reached when the chapter is read as providing support in the 
form of argument for a theory of judgment that in turn provides the needed evidence that connects hinein to 
legein.
9. The expression "pronounced by" in Hicks’ translation has been placed within brackets since it misleads the 
reader to infer that Aristotle is referring to perceptions rather than perceptible things.
10. The passage may well be De Anima III 427b 14.
11. Associating kritika with judging, Nussbaum (1978) 334, remarks, has been defended by several scholars, 
Farquarson, Forster and Louis; references to Farquharson (1912), Forster (1937) and Louis (1952). Nussbaum 
argues in favor of dismissing the view that associates kritika with judging "because all these are faculties which 
are involved in discriminating or making decisions. To support her position she refers the reader to a 1973 
unpublished essay by J. Cooper, titled "Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," read at the Princeton 
University Conference on Ancient Philosophy. Nussbaum understands Cooper to have "concluded from a 
careful survey of the uses of κρίνειν in connection with αϊσθησις in the DA that there is no need to interpret 
it as implying that any kind of explicit or reflective judgment is taking place —· and in particular that it need 
not be associated with ‘explicit verbal performance or the disposition to such — as indeed we can readily infer 
from his assertion of κρίνειν to animals, despite his rather low estimate of animal intelligence’." I regret not 
having seen Cooper’s article.
12. Randall (1960) expresses a reservation that helps make clear why his interpretation of logos is 
objectionable. "Aristotle’s conclusion may be stated: Whatever is can be expressed in words and discourse. 
There is nothing that cannot be talked about, nothing wholly inaccessible to discourse, nothing ‘ineffable’. But 
discourse is not its own subject matter — unless the talking is about language itself. Discourse is ‘about’ 
something that is not itself discourse; though what it is about — its subject matter — has a discursive or logical
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character, and that character, that intelligible structure, is just what discourse can express and state. Whatever 
is can be known. There is nothing that is unknowable” (122). If this is Aristotle’s position, it would be 
impossible for logos to inquire into logos, and hence impossible to arrive at a theory of logos.
13. According to Randall: "The ‘reason why’ man lives in a polis, to dioti, is that aloné of all animals man 
possesses logos, the power of speech. It is significant that the same logos that makes man a ‘rational animal’ 
in its sense of ‘reason’ also in its sense of discourse and language, makes him a ‘political’ or social animal. For 
speech serves to indicate the advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the right and the wrong. Through 
speech it is man alone who has a sense of good and bad, right and wrong. And it is in partnership in these 
things that makes every human association, from family to the polis." (254)
14. A key to understand the effective role of logos is given in Metaphysics 1020a4, where Aristotle states the 
following: ώστε ό κύριος δρος τής πρώτης δυνάμεως αν εϊη άρχή μεταβλητική έν άλλω ή ή αλλφ. In De 
Cáelo 301b 18: φύσις μεν έστιν ή έν αύτώ ύπάρχουσα κινήσεως αρχή, δύναμις δ* ή έν αλλφ ή ή αλλφ. How 
does this formulation of logos qua dynamis work in the case of language? Logos "moves" language, actualizes 
it, so to speak. In fact, the actualization of logos effects the refinement and perfecting of language.
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